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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shannon Marie McKean appeals from her judgment of conviction upon a 
jury's verdict that she is guilty of five counts of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver. McKean argues the district court erred when it 
excluded as irrelevant, evidence that McKean relied on lab reports 
accompanying the products she purchased to re-sell. McKean also argues the 
district court erred by instructing the jury that AM-2201 was a controlled 
substance, citing the Court of Appeals' recent decision in State v. Alley, 155 
Idaho 972, 318 P.3d 962 (Ct. App. 2014). To the extent Alley holds that AM-
2201 is not a Schedule I substance enumerated in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30), this 
Court should disavow that holding as a misinterpretation of the statute and its 
legislative history. Correctly interpreting and applying Idaho statutory and case 
law, this Court should affirm the district court's rulings and McKean's judgment of 
conviction. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged McKean with five counts of possessing a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver. (R., pp. 79-81, 305-08.) Four of the counts 
were for possessing products called AK-47, Mad Hatter, Scooby Snax, and 
Down2Earth, which contained the substance known as AM-2201. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 
362, Ls. 9-11; p. 363, Ls. 5-25;p. 364, Ls. 8-14; R., pp. 79-81.) The fifth count 
was for possessing a product called Fire N' Ice which contained the substance 
known as JWH-210/122. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 360, Ls. 1-2; R., pp. 79-81.) 
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The state filed a pre-trial motion for a ruling that JWH-210/122 and AM-
2201 are controlled substances. (R., pp. 107-09.) The trial court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing at which the parties presented evidence, including testimony 
by expert witnesses. (See Tr., Vol. I.) McKean contested that AM-2201 is· a 
controlled substance, but did not dispute that JWH-210/122 fell within Idaho's 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 6, L. 22 - p. 7, L. 2.) The trial 
court determined that "AM-2201 is a controlled substance that falls within Idaho 
Code 37-2705(30)." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 211, Ls. 10-13.) The trial court instructed the 
jury to this effect after the close of evidence. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 460, Ls. 3-5; R., p. 
381.) 
In his opening statement, defense counsel conceded that McKean 
possessed and sold the products identified in the state's charging document. 
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 139, L. 22 - p. 140, L. 2.) McKean's defense was that she 
believed the products she was selling were not synthetic cannabinoids. (Tr., Vol. 
II, p. 175, Ls. 21-24.) The state objected to McKean's opening statement that 
the jury would hear evidence McKean relied on lab reports from distributors of 
her products which indicated those products did not contain controlled 
substances. (Tr., Vol. 11, p. 144, Ls. 16-22.) The trial court ruled that McKean 
could not put on evidence that she relied on those lab reports because such 
defense amounted to a mistake-of-law argument; and whether McKean knew or 
believed her products were illegal controlled substances was irrelevant. (Tr., Vol. 
II, p. 167, L. 3 - p. 170, L. 9.) 
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The jury found McKean guilty of the five counts of possessing a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver. (R., pp. 396-98.) The trial court sentenced 
McKean to unified terms of five years with two years fixed as to each count, to 
run concurrently. (R., pp. 409-12.) McKean timely appealed. (R, pp. 420-22, 
426-32.) 
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ISSUES 
McKean states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err by concluding that AM-2201 was a 
controlled substance as a matter of law? 
2. Did the district court err by excluding evidence that Ms. 
McKean relied on reports indicating that the substances 
were not synthetic cannabinoids? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Applying the statute and rules of statutory construction to the record 
before it, did the trial court properly determine that AM-2201 falls within 
the definition of a Schedule I controlled substance in I.C. § 37-
2705(d)(30)(ii)(a)? And to the extent State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 
P.3d 962 (Ct. App. 2014) holds otherwise, should Alley be disavowed? 
2. Has McKean failed to show error by the trial court in excluding evidence 
McKean relied on lab reports that showed only a mistake of law and were 
therefore irrelevant? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Applying The Statute And Rules Of Statutory Construction To The Record 
Before It, The Trial Court Properly Determined That AM-2201 Fits The Definition 
Of A Schedule I Controlled Substance Set Forth In I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a); 
And To The Extent State v. Alley Holds Otherwise, Alley Should Be Disavowed 
A. Introduction 
McKean argues her conviction must be vacated because the jury was 
precluded from deciding a factual issue before it when the trial court instructed 
the jury that AM-2201 is a controlled substance as a matter of law. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 5-12.) In support, McKean cites the Court of Appeals' recent decision 
in State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d 962 (Ct. App. 2014). In that decision, 
the Court misapplied principles of statutory interpretation and the rule of lenity in 
holding that AM-2201 is not "in the enumerated examples" of a schedule I 
controlled substance listed in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). 1 kl at_, 318 P.3d at 
969. When properly applied, the legislative history and intent dictate that AM-
2201 is enumerated in the statute by its chemical structure. Accordingly, this 
Court should disavow Alley, to the extent it holds otherwise, and affirm the trial 
court's determination that AM-2201 fits the statutory definition of a Schedule I 
substance. 
1 Here as in Alley, the applicable version of I.C. § 37-2075(d) - as referenced 
throughout this brief - is the version just prior to that which took effect in 2013 
and clarified that AM-2201 is a schedule I controlled substance. (See Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 155, Ls. 9-16 (defense expert McDougal testified that the statutory language in 
the latest amendment closed loopholes within which AM-2201 - in his opinion -
had fallen).) 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate courts freely review issues of statutory interpretation. State 
v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271,274, 92 P.3d 521,524 (2004); State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 
502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a statute is unambiguous, 
the legislature's "clearly expressed intent ... must be given effect," and there is 
no need to apply rules of statutory construction. Doe, 140 Idaho at 274, 92 P.3d 
at 524; see also Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 
889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). However, where "reasonable minds might 
differ or be uncertain" as to a statute's meaning, then there is ambiguity, and the 
courts "will construe the statute to give effect to the legislative intent." Doe, 140 
Idaho at 274, 92 P.3d at 524 (citing In re Williamson, 135 Idaho 452, 455, 19 
P.3d 766, 769 (2001)). 
Where a criminal statute is ambiguous and such "ambiguity remains after 
examining the text, context, history, and policy of the statute," the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has held that the rule of lenity applies, such that statute is construed in 
favor of the accused. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, _, 318 P.3d 955, 959 
(Ct. App. 2014). The United States Supreme Court has said the rule of lenity 
'"comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress 
has expressed' ... and 'applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of 
statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute."' Burgess v. U.S., 
553 U.S. 124, 135 (2008)(citations omitted); see also Trusdall, 155 Idaho at_, 
318 P.3d at 959. "To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the 
literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed 
6 
interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative history." State v. 
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). "Statutes must 'be 
construed as a whole without separating one provision from another."' Doe, 140 
Idaho at 275, 92 P.3d at 525 (citation omitted). 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That AM-2201 Is A Schedule I 
Controlled Substance Under I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) 
The provision at issue, I.C. § 37-2705, uses nomenclature developed by 
the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) to identify or 
define what substances are included in Schedule I of Idaho's Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act. (See Tr., Vol. I, p. 44, L. 24 - p. 46, L. 23.) In relevant part, 
subsection (d)(30)(ii)(a) included "[t]he following synthetic drugs" in Schedule I: 
"any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole . by 
substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl 
2705( d)(30)(ii)( a). 
" I.C. § 37-
The state's expert Corinna Owsley presented testimony to the trial judge 
in pre-trial proceedings that she was part of the team that presented the draft bill 
for the drug legislation to the House and Senate committees. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 43, 
L. 19 - p. 44, L. 20.) Owsley testified that AM-2201 has a base structure of 3-(1-
naphthoyl)indole (Tr., Vol. I, p. 53, Ls. 7-8), and its "substitution at the nitrogen 
atom of the indole ring" is "removal of a hydrogen atom" by "doing a reaction to 
change it" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 53, L. 16 - p. 54, L. 11). Owsley also testified the 
substitution is with "a fluoropentyl group." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 54, Ls. 11-15.) Further 
explaining "fluoropentyl group" and "alkyl," Owsley testified: 
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Owsley: Alkyl, in its most narrowest sense, is a carbon 
hydrogen chain. The halogenated or the haloalkyl is 
a substituted alkyl group, which is first named by 
naming the alkyl group and adding the prefix of the 
halogen, or the fluoro, in this instance. So we get 
fluoropentyl, because we have five carbons, so we 
have a pentyl group. 
Prosecutor: Okay. So if I'm understanding right, alkyl is a broader 
group, or a parent group. Or am I using the right 
words there? 
Owsley: Alkyl is a carbon hydrogen chain, but in this instance, 
in the code we were looking at naming these 
structures, and we put in alkyl as how you would 
name the substituent, and this is named as an alkyl 
group. 
Prosecutor: Okay. It's named as an alkyl group, but more 
Owsley: 
specifically, fluoroalkyl? 
Yes. It's a - it's a haloalkyl, in this instance, because 
it's [sic] fluorine is the halogen. It's a fluoroalkyl. 
Prosecutor: Okay. But you didn't put in the term haloalkyl? 
Owsley: No. It was intended to be included with the alkyl 
groups. 
(Tr., Vo. I, p. 60, L. 11 - p. 61, L. 9.) Moreover, Owsley testified that she 
assisted in the drafting and presentation of the statute to the Idaho Legislature, 
and it was her opinion that "AM-2201 is one of the many chemicals or 
compounds within Idaho's Schedule I." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 43, Ls. 19-25; p. 47, Ls. 2-
8; p. 97, Ls. 22-24; State's Exhibit 1, p. 2.) Owsley testified that AM-2201 is a 
synthetic cannabinoid. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 49, Ls. 2-8, 20-22.) 
McKean does not dispute that AM-2201 has a base structure of 3-(1-
naphthoyl)indole. (Appellant's brief, p. 7.) McKean's expert, Owen McDougal, 
like Owsley, testified that the substitution at the nitrogen atom in AM-2201 is a 
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haloalkyl. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 162, Ls. 18-19 ("AM-2201 is a haloalkyl attached to the 
nitrogen. That's clear as can be.").) However, in McDougal's opinion, the 
language "by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyf' does 
not include AM-2201 because "alkyl" does not encompass "haloalkyl." (Tr., Vol. 
I, p. 162, Ls. 4-8, 15-19.) 
McDougal testified that the changes in the current "legislation got it right .. 
. [')substitution at the nitrogen to any extent['] covers all bases." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
163, Ls. 16-18.) According to McDougal, the statutory language that applied to 
McKean's case had a limitation that "has provided loopholes, of which I - it's my 
opinion that AM-2201 falls within one of them." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 155, Ls. 11-16.) 
McDougal said he believed the current legislation "did a much better job of 
encompassing a much wider range of potential drugs than did the [prior 
version]." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 155, 9-11.) McDougal further testified, "if the intent were 
to be a large umbrella to cover everything, our legislation now does that." (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 163, Ls. 16-24.) 
The competing interpretations of I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) presented by 
Owsley and McDougal, both familiar with IUPAC nomenclature, demonstrate that 
the sub-provision is ambiguous. In other words, "reasonable minds might differ 
or be uncertain" as to its meaning. Doe, 140 Idaho at 274, 92 P.3d at 524. 
Given the ambiguity, the courts must look to the legislative intent of the statute, 
examining "not only ... the literal words of the statute ... but also the context of 
those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history." 
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). 
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In Alley, the Court of Appeals, upon finding (d)(30)(ii)(a) ambiguous, 
looked to the legislative intent. 155 Idaho at_, 318 P.3d at 969. The Alley 
Court quoted the following purpose statement: 
The purpose of the legislation is to create safe regulations for the 
public concerning Tetrahydrocannabinols from synthetic drugs 
(Spice) that mimic the effects of Cannabis and identifying additional 
substances to be classified in schedule 1. This legislation 
continues what is currently being enforced by the Board of 
Pharmacy. Declaring an emergency. 
kl (quoting Statement of Purpose, HB 139 (2011 )). The Court also quoted from 
the statute's preface, providing, "An act relating to uniform controlled substances; 
amending Section 37-2705, Idaho Code, to identify additional substances to be 
classified in schedule I, and declaring an emergency." kl (quoting 2011 Idaho 
Sess. Laws, ch. 47.) Examining the statute as a whole, the purpose and 
prefatory statements show the legislature's intent to expand the substances 
included in schedule 1. But in Alley, the Court narrowed its inquiry to the 
legislature's intent in using the term "alkyl." kl 
Given the technical nature of the statute's wording, it would be surprising 
if the legislative history included discussion of any specific term using the IUPAC 
nomenclature - whether "alkyl" or another. Had the legislature or any of the bill's 
sponsors anticipated that "alkyl" would result in ambiguity, as it did, the term 
likely would have been replaced. A search for legislative intent or context 
behind that single technical term is a futile endeavor, if not an empty gesture, 
toward actually resolving the ambiguity. 
However, considering the legislature's general purpose to expand the list 
of schedule 1 substances, it can be inferred that the term "alkyl" in "substitution 
10 
at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl" is intended to include all alkyls, 
including "haloalkyl." (See Tr., Vol. I, p. 61, Ls. 6-9.) The legislature intended to 
broadly include any substance having the identified base structure (3-( 1-
naphthoyl)indole ), with a substituent in the alkyl group, which includes AM-2201. 
Indeed, the legislature has since amended (d)(30)(ii)(a) to use the more general 
language "by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring to any extent." 
I.C. § 37-2705(d)(31)(ii)(a)(eff. April 3, 2013)(emphasis added). 
Legislative amendments can be made "to clarify or strengthen the existing 
provisions of a statute." State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120, 123, 294 P.3d 1132, 
1135 (Ct. App. 2013)(citing Pearl v. Bd. of Prof. Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of 
Medicine, 137 Idaho 107, 113-14, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168-69 (2002))(other citations 
omitted). In the recent bill revising the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 
ultimately passed into law, prefatory comments indicate legislative intent "to 
revise provisions relating to Schedule I controlled substances and to make 
technical corrections .... " 2012 Idaho Laws ch. 181 (H.B. 502)(emphasis 
added). As McDougal acknowledged in his testimony at McKean's pre-trial 
evidentiary hearing, the latest legislation "got it right" and now includes AM-2201. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 163, Ls. 16-18.) It is apparent the revised statute was intended to 
clarify the version applicable in the Alley case and here. 
The Alley Court recognized that the house and senate committee minutes 
showed the purpose of the proposed legislation, which was eventually adopted 
and passed, was to "target[ ] the 'backbone structure' of the chemicals used to 
produce spice variations." Alley, 155 Idaho at_, 318 P.3d at 969. The Court 
11 
recognized that these comments are "consistent with the interpretation forwarded 
by the state and the testimony of the state's expert." kl However, the Court 
rejected the statement's usefulness because it "was not specific to the meaning 
of the term 'alkyl' and could have referred to other chemical compounds in the 
statute, such as the 3-(1-naphthoyle)indole ... which the state's expert also 
referred to as a 'backbone structure."' kl The Court fails to explain why the 
statement could not be applied to both "alkyl" and "3-(1-naphthoyle)indole." 
Such a reading is still consistent with the testimony of the state's expert (in Alley 
and here in McKean's case), and does not render the statute a nullity. See Doe, 
140 Idaho at 275, 92 P.3d at 525. 
The Alley Court also cited I.C. 37-2705(f)(3)(i), which defines "substituted 
cathinones" by chemical structure and the notation, "whether or not the 
compound is further modified ... [b]y substitution in the ring system to any 
extent with alkyl ... [or] haloa/kyl." Alley, 155 Idaho at_, 318 P.3d at 969; I.C. 
§ 37-2705(f)(3)(i)(emphasis added). Because that subsection lists both alkyl and 
haloalkyl, the Court concluded, the legislature intended to distinguish the terms. 
Id. This supports that there was a need for a "technical correction" in 
(d)(30)(ii)(a), which correction was made. But in light of the revision, the 
legislative history ultimately reflects, and public policy supports, that the 
legislature's intent was for language regarding substituents in (d)(30)(ii)(a) to 
cover AM-2201. There is no dispute the current statute now does so. 
The Idaho courts, including the Alley Court, have recognized the need to 
examine statutes and their legislative intent in "the context of those words, [and] 
12 
the public policy behind the statute." Alley, 155 Idaho at_, 318 P.3d at 966 
(citation omitted); see also Doe, 140 Idaho at 275, 92 P.3d at 525 (citation 
omitted). But in Alley, the Court ignored the context of the term "alkyl" as well as 
the stated policy of expanding the list of regulated substances known as "spice" 
to address an identified public health "emergency." Alley, 155 Idaho at_, 318 
P.3d at 969. This Court should reject the Court of Appeals' statutory analysis in 
Alley. 
In Alley, the Court's interpretation of the term "alkyl" and overly-narrow 
application of legislative intent ignored the clearly stated broader purpose of the 
statute. Moreover, the result - the Court's application of the rule of lenity -
achieved the opposite result from statute's stated purpose. Construing the 
statute in favor of the defendant, the Court in Alley concluded that AM-2201 was 
not enumerated as a schedule I controlled substance under the statute. Alley, 
155 Idaho at_, 318 P.3d at 969. Rather, the Court held that AM-2201 could be 
found, on a case-by-case basis, to have "a similar chemical structure" with 
schedule I substances, a result inconsistent with the legislative intent. kt at_, 
318 P.3d at 970. In light of the record and the legislature's stated intent in 
passing the applicable version of 1.C. § 37-2705, the trial court here properly 
determined that AM-2201 is a schedule I controlled substance as a matter of law 
rather than a jury question. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
ruling, and disavow Alley to the extent that decision would require a contrary 
result. 
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Even if this Court were to reverse and remand as to the trial court's 
conclusion that AM-2201 is illegal, such remand would not affect McKean's 
judgment of conviction as to the "spice" containing JWH-210/122. Before trial, 
McKean conceded that JWH-210/122 is a schedule I controlled substance. (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 6, L. 22 - p. 7, L. 2.) Thus, on Count I, McKean's judgment and 
sentence would stand. (R., pp. 306, 396, 409.) 
II. 
McKean Has Failed To Show Error By The Trial Court In Excluding Evidence 
McKean Relied On Lab Reports That Showed Only A Mistake Of Law And Were 
Therefore Irrelevant 
A. Introduction 
McKean argues the trial court erred when it excluded evidence she relied 
on purported lab reports that caused her to believe the substances she bought to 
re-sell in her store were legal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-19.) According to 
McKean, the evidence that she relied on these reports was relevant because it 
was offered to show its effect on her as listener. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) 
However, that alleged effect is a mistake of law argument. As such, the 
evidence was not relevant and was properly excluded. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court's determination that evidence is relevant is a matter of law 
subject to free review. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 
590 (2010). 
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C. The Record Does Not Support, And McKean Has Failed To Show, Her 
Mistake Was One Of Fact Rather Than Law 
McKean concedes that a mistake of law is not a valid defense. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 16.) However, McKean contends that her mistake was one 
of fact, and cites as support, State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 703, 132 P.3d 455, 
460 (Ct. App. 2006)(abrogation on other grounds recognized in State v. Galvan, 
_ P.3d _, 2014 WL 775660 (Ct. App. 2014)(citing Salinas v. Texas, _ U.S. 
_, 133 S.Ct. 2174, 2179-80 (2013))). The record distinguishes the facts of this 
case from those discussed in Stefani. 
In Stefani, the Court of Appeals wrote: 
... one might possess an illegal drug under the mistaken 
belief that it was a legal substance - for example possessing 
methamphetamine while truly believing that it was sugar. In such a 
case, the defendant's mistake of fact, if believed by the jury, 
requires an acquittal because the criminal intent element of the 
offense is not present. 
Stefani, 142 Idaho at 703, 132 P.3d at 460. According to McKean, her mistake 
was not about the legality of the substances she purchased, but the nature of 
what those substances were. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17.) In other words, her 
mistake was akin to believing - as hypothesized in Stefani - that what she 
bought was sugar, or a substance the possession of which is unquestionably 
legal. 
But here, McKean was charged with possessing "spice" containing AM-
2201 and JWH-210/122. Reports concluding that the substances McKean 
bought were legal - or evidence that McKean relied on those reports - do not 
address a mistake of fact. They do not show that McKean believed the 
substances were something other than spice, such as sugar. They show that 
15 
she hoped or believed the substances were not illegal. 
conceded, her mistake of law is not a defense. 
As McKean has 
Because the evidence only addressed McKean's mistake of law, it was 
not relevant. The trial court therefore properly excluded the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm McKean's judgment 
of conviction. The trial court did not err in excluding evidence that only 
addressed McKean's mistake of law, or in concluding that AM-2201 is a 
schedule I controlled substance. This Court should disavow Alley to the extent it 
conflicts with the trial court's findings. If this Court does reverse and remand, 
McKean's judgment and sentence as to Count 1, regarding JWH-210/122 must 
not be disturbed. 
DATED this 28th day of April, 2014. 
~~ 
DAPHN~ J. HUANG U 
Deputy Attorney General 
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